This paper analyzes the political economy of public education and in-cash transfer in an overlapping generations model of a two-class society in which the dynamics of inequality is driven by the accumulation of human capital. The two redistributive policies are determined by voting, while private education that supplements public education is purchased individually. The model, which includes two-dimensional voting, demonstrates either of the following two types of stable steady-state equilibria, which are in line with the evidence: a high-inequality equilibrium with government expenditure favoring lump-sum transfer, or a low-inequality equilibrium with that favoring public education. JEL Classi…cation Numbers: D72, D91, I24
Introduction
In most developed countries, redistribution is carried out through in-kind transfer programs such as public education for successive generations, as well as through in-cash transfer programs such as social security and welfare budgets within the current generation. The size and the composition of redistributive policies in democratic countries are determined via voting, and redistributive expenditures a¤ect human capital formation and thus the next generation's income distribution, which in turn have an e¤ect on future voting over in-cash and in-kind redistribution programs. Therefore, it is natural to expect some correlation between inequality and the size and composition of redistributive expenditures. Figure 1 illustrates a scatter plot of the Gini index and the ratio of in-cash transfer to public education expenditure in OECD (Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development) countries. The …gure shows a positive correlation between inequality and the ratio. High-inequality countries are associated with a large share of in-cash transfer in government expenditure, whereas low-inequality countries are associated with a large share of public education in government expenditure. The aim of this study is to develop a model that explains this cross-country di¤erence, and to clarify the role of private education and family backgrounds in policymaking tackling inequality and redistribution.
[ Figure 1 here.]
For the purpose of analysis, we use the framework in which Gradstein and Justman (1996) investigate the role of private education as an alternative to public education.
The present model di¤ers from theirs in the following two aspects. First, Gradstein and Justman (1996) consider public education as only a means of redistribution, while the present model allows for in-cash, lump-sum transfer as an alternative to public education.
The presence of lump-sum transfer might incentivize some agents to prefer lump-sum transfer to public education, and to make use of the transfer bene…ts for private education for their children. Second, Gradstein and Justman (1996) assume that the marginal productivity of education is constant, while the present model assumes that it is dependent on human capital.
In particular, the present paper assumes that the marginal productivity of private education increases with the parents'human capital level. This assumption re ‡ects the family background e¤ect: educated parents can provide their children a better environment for learning (Gertler and Glewwe, 1990 ).
The present model, which includes the above two aspects, works as follows. There are two types of family dynasties classi…ed according to their endowed level of human capital: low and high. An agent in each type of family enters adulthood with a stock of human capital invested by his/her parents, earns after-tax labor income, and receives lump-sum transfer bene…ts form the government. He/she decides the allocation of the disposable income between current consumption and private investment in his/her child's further education. The private educational investment combined with public education determines his/her child's human capital level, which determines the child's income. Every adult agent votes over the tax rate as well as the allocation of tax revenue between public education and lump-sum transfer. Given the bidimensional issue space, the Nash equilibrium of a majority voting game may fail to exist. To deal with this,
we use the concept of issue-by-issue voting, that is, the notion of a structure-induced Nash equilibrium voting game formalized by Shepsle (1979) and applied by Conde-Ruiz and Galasso (2003, 2005) for the framework of overlapping generations. Throughout the paper, the low-type individuals are the majority in the economy. We compute the lowtype's preferred allocation for a given tax rate and his/her preferred tax rate for a given allocation, and …nd the point where these two reaction functions cross.
Based on the notion of structure-induced Nash equilibrium voting, we …rst focus on some period t and demonstrate the period-t political equilibrium outcome for a given inequality level. When inequality is low, the economy attains an equilibrium with government expenditure favoring public education. The low-type individuals, as the majority, prefer public education to lump-sum transfer because their income is not far from the average and they have a certain level of income. When inequality is high, the economy attains an equilibrium with government expenditure favoring lump-sum transfer. The low-type individuals feel the need for support via lump-sum transfer to compensate for their low income.
The characterization of the period-t political equilibrium enables us to show the e¤ect of inequality on redistribution policy, but not the mutual interaction between inequality and redistribution policy. To illustrate the interaction, we analyze the dynamics of inequality and redistribution policies across periods, and show that the family backgrounds do a¤ect the joint determination of inequality and redistribution policy. In particular,
we show that the economy with weaker family background e¤ect attains a more equal state with government expenditure favoring public education, and that the economy with the stronger family background e¤ect attains a less equal state with government expenditure favoring lump-sum transfer. The result provides one possible explanation for the cross-country di¤erence in inequality and redistribution policy observed in Figure 1 . The remainder of this paper is as follows. We …rst present a literature review. Thereafter, Section 2 sets up the model and characterizes an economic equilibrium. Section 3 considers voting behavior of agents and characterizes political equilibria in each period.
Sections 4 shows the existence and stability of a steady-state equilibrium, and clari…es the role of family backgrounds in the joint determination of inequality and redistribution policy. Section 5 checks the robustness of the result under alternative assumptions. Some proofs are relegated to Appendix.
Literature Review
In the recent decades, there has been an increasing amount of literature on the political economy of inequality and redistribution (see, e.g., Persson and Tabellini, 2000 and Borck, 2007, for a survey). However, most of these focus on either redistribution in cash through lump-sum transfer (e.g., Romer, 1975; Roberts, 1977 inequality of voters. However, in their models, the tax rate is considered exogenous to ensure voting over one dimension. In addition, there is no dynamic interaction between inequality and redistributive policy because pre-tax income distribution is exogenously given in their static frameworks.
Bernasconi and Profeta (2012) overcome the limitations in the above mentioned studies by developing a two-period overlapping generations model of a two-class society with human capital accumulation. They consider probabilistic voting over public education and lump-sum transfer within a generation. However, private education as an alternative to public education, which occurs to a signi…cant extent in many developed countries (OECD, 2013) , is exempted from their analysis, because their focus is on the role of public education as a device to provide for recognizing the talent of poor-born children. 1 The literature review thus far suggests that the following questions remain unresolved.
How do the politics of public education and lump-sum transfer a¤ect economic decision 1 Arcalean and Schiopu (2010) study the interaction between public and private education expenditure. However, they abstract away from voting and consider education policy as given. Their focus is on the e¤ect of change in education policy on human capital accumulation and growth. over private education of agents? How does the decision in turn a¤ect the inequality among agents and their preferences over the size and the composition of redistributive expenditures? What are the dynamic, long-run consequences of this interaction for inequality and redistributive policy? What causes the di¤erence in inequality and redistribution policy across countries? The contribution of this paper is to answer these unresolved issues in the previous studies, and to show that private education and family background play crucial roles in answering these issues.
The Model and Economic Equilibrium
We consider a discrete-time overlapping generations economy that starts at time 0. Each adult agent produces one o¤spring; hence, the population remains constant in every generation. The fraction of type-i agents within each generation is given by i 2 (0; 1), where i is constant across generations and satis…es 0 < H < 0:5 < L < 1 with P i i = 1. The assumption implies that in every period, type-L agents are the majority in the economy. This assumption re ‡ects the right-skewed income distribution in the real world. In Section 5, we undertake a brief analysis of an alternative case where the type-H agents are the majority in the economy.
Preferences and Budget Constraints
A type-i adult agent at time t is endowed at the time he/she enters adulthood with a stock of human capital h i t , which also de…nes his/her e¤ective labor capacity. He/she receives a lump-sum transfer from the government, b t . Given the income tax t and the transfer b t , a type-i adult decides the allocation of disposable income between current consumption, c i t , and private investment in his/her child's further education, z i t , subject to the budget constraint,
A type-i adult of generation t derives utility from current consumption, c ; where 2 (0; 1) is a common parameter re ‡ecting the bequest motive. A higher implies a greater incentive for educational investment. We employ this logarithmic utility function for tractability of analysis. In Section 5, it is shown that the result is qualitatively unchanged when we employ a constant elasticity-of-substitution utility function.
Human Capital Formation
The level of o¤spring's education, h i t+1 , is determined by public schooling, e t , as well as by privately purchased supplementary education, z i t . We assume that the individual level of education is determined by the human capital production function,
The variable h t denotes the average human capital in period t, and the variable The function above has the following two features. First, the marginal productivity of public education depends on the average human capital representing, for example, the quality of teachers in public schools (de la Croix and Doepke, 2004). On the other hand, the marginal productivity of private education depends on the parents' human capital level, implying that"educated parents can provide an environment conductive to better learning, such as directly helping children with schoolwork, which will also raise the human capital received per year by the child" (Gertler and Glewwe, 1990 ). This feature is further discussed in Section 5. Second, the parameter A i (> 0) represents a durable productive asset handed from generation to generation, such as genetic ability, technology transfer, and business succession (Gradstein and Justman, 1996) . The distribution of A i is assumed to be stationary over time and to be positively correlated to human capital, h This assumption implies that on average, children born in higher-income families are endowed with a higher productivity of human capital, and thus, a higher learning technology (see, e.g., Huggett, Ventura and Yaron, 2006). 2 A possible extension is to assume that children have the same genetic ability with a probability q. For example, children born in higher-income families have high genetic ability, A H , with a probability q, while they have low genetic ability, A L , with a probability 1 q. Bernasconi and Profeta (2012) assume that this genetic probability of talent transmission, q, is not generally known in public, thereby resulting in the talent mismatch. The current paper abstracts away from the talent transmission and mismatch; instead, it focuses on the interaction between public and private education choice.
Government Budget Constraint
In each period, the government raises tax revenue to …nance the provision of uniform public schooling for all children, e t , as well as lump-sum transfer, b t : The fraction t 2 [0; 1] of the tax revenue is devoted to lump-sum transfer; the rest is devoted to public schooling.
Thus, the government budget constraint is given by
where the term h t is the average human capital in period t, which is equivalent to the aggregate income in that period. The term (1 t ) denotes the distortionary factor that represents e¢ ciency loss of taxation. This assumption, which is common in the political economy literature (see, e.g., Conde-Ruiz and Galasso, 2004; Conde-Ruiz and Profeta, 2007; Bethencourt and Galasso, 2008), is solely to ensure an interior solution to preferred tax rates and otherwise plays no role.
The timing of events in period t is as follows. First, adult agents vote on the tax rate t as well as the fraction of tax revenue devoted to lump-sum transfer t by majority vote. Second, subject to the budget constraint, each agent decides on the allocation of disposable income between consumption and private education. We solve the model by backward induction.
Economic Equilibrium
Given a sequence of tax rates and the sizes of redistribution and public education, f t ; b t ; e t g 1 t=0 , an economic equilibrium is a sequence of allocations, fz 
The variable L t , on which we will focus in the following sections, captures the extent of income inequality in the economy; a higher L t implies less inequality.
The utility maximization problem of a type-i agent in period t is as follows:
subject to Solving the utility maximization problem of a type-i agent leads to the following private education decision:
Equation (1) states that the investment decision depends on an adult's human capital h i t as well as government policy variables, t , b t and e t . In particular, an agent chooses to invest in private education if his/her human capital is high, the tax rate is low, the size of redistribution is large, and/or the level of public education is low; otherwise, he/she chooses no private investment in education and consumes all of his/her disposable income.
With the use of (1) and the budget constraint, we can write the consumption function
The sum of the e¤ective public and private educational investments, e t + (
The utility obtained by agents in economic equilibrium is represented by their indirect utility functions. We use the above mentioned investment and consumption functions to obtain an indirect utility function of a type-i agent as follows:
where V i t;z>0 denotes the indirect utility of a type-i agent when he/she invests some portion of his/her income in private education, and V i t;z=0 denotes the indirect utility when he/she does not invest in private education.
With the use of the government budget constraints b t = t (1 t ) t h t and e t = (1
This inequality condition is more likely to be satis…ed as the tax rate t is lower and the share of redistribution in government expenditure t is higher. A lower tax rate and a higher share of redistribution in government expenditure produce a larger income e¤ect, thereby giving an agent an incentive to invest in private education.
With the use of condition (2) and the government budget constraints, we can write the indirect utility function in terms of the tax rate t and the fraction t as follows:
Period t Political Equilibrium
In each period t, the tax rate t and the proportion t are determined by period-t adult agents through a political process of majority voting. Type-L and type-H adult agents cast a ballot over t ; the income tax rate, and t , the share of lump-sum transfer in government expenditure. Individual preferences over the two issues are represented by the indirect utility function in (3) for i = L; H. Every agent has zero mass, and thus, no individual vote can change the outcome of the election. Therefore, we assume that agents vote sincerely. The current majority voting game is characterized by a bidimensional issue space, and . Thus, a Nash equilibrium may not exist within the majority voting game. To deal with this, we use the concept of issue-by-issue voting, or the structure-induced Nash equilibrium, as formalized by Shepsle (1979) and applied by Conde-Ruiz and Galasso (2003, 2005) to the framework of overlapping generations. Under the concept of the structure-induced Nash equilibrium, a su¢ cient condition for ( t ; t ) to be a period-t political equilibrium of the voting game is that t represents the outcome of majority voting over t when the other dimension is …xed at its level t , and vice versa, provided that preferences are single peaked along every dimension of the issue space. 
Type-L' s Preferred Policy When
Suppose that the type-L agent invests a part of his/her income in education. The condition (2) is rewritten in terms of L t as follows:
Under the condition in (4), the type-L agent, as a decisive voter, chooses t to maximize
The …rst term on the right-hand side shows the marginal cost of taxation; the second term shows the marginal bene…t of taxation. The above equation indicates that the marginal cost is independent of the share of redistribution in government expenditure, t , while the marginal bene…t is increasing in t . Therefore, there is a critical value of t , and type L agents will …nd it optimal to bear no tax burden when t is below this critical value, while they …nd it optimal to bear some tax burden when t is above the critical value. The optimal choice of t by type-L agents is summarized as follows:
where the superscript and the subscript in [ Figure 2 here.]
The period-t political equilibrium when z L t > 0 is the point where the two reaction (5), we can compute the period-t equilibrium policy when z
; 0 . We substitute the policy into the condition z The corresponding policy is
; 0 :
The condition in Lemma 1,
1=(1+ ) ; 1 , determines the investment decision by the type-L agents. The condition says that the type-L's income is not far from the average. They have a certain level of income and thus can a¤ord to invest in private education. However, they feel the need for public support toward education because the marginal productivity of public education is higher than that of the private education …nanced by the lump-sum transfer. Therefore, they prefer public education to lump-sum transfer and thus want to …nance education both privately and publicly.
Suppose that the type-L agent does not invest in private education:
Under the condition in (6), the type-L agent, as a decisive voter, chooses t to maximize his/her indirect utility V 
The …rst term on the right-hand side shows the marginal cost of taxation; the second term shows the marginal bene…t of taxation via redistribution; and the third terms shows the marginal bene…t of taxation via public education. Corner solutions, t = 0 and 1, are not optimal for type L agents because @V L t;z=0 =@ t t=0 = +1 > 0 and @V L t;z=0 =@ t t=1 = 1 < 0 hold. Thus, the optimal solution satis…es @V L t;z=0 =@ t = 0, which results in
Next, consider the choice of t by the type L agents when they do not invest in private education, z 
The …rst term on the right-hand side shows the marginal bene…t from an increase in redistribution, and the second term shows the marginal cost from a decrease in spending on public education. When the tax rate t is low, the latter e¤ect overcomes the former one; type L agents prefer no redistribution, t = 0. However, when the tax rate is high, the two opposing e¤ects are o¤set at some level of t 2 (0; 1). In this case, the optimal share satis…es @V L t;z=0 =@ t = 0. Therefore, the preferred share t for type L agents is summarized as The corresponding policy is
Proof. See Appendix A.1. The condition in Lemma 2,
, implies that the type-L's income level is too low to pay for private education. Because of this negative income e¤ect on private education, they prefer public education to private education regardless of the relative e¢ ciency of private education. Therefore, they choose e t > 0 for voting and
The remaining condition determines the type-L's preferences for lump-sum transfer. First, consider the case in which the type-L's income level is moderately high:
. In this case, they feel no need for government support via lump-sum transfer, and …nd it optimal to use all the tax revenue for public education. Therefore, they choose a set of policies distinguished by no provision of lump-sum transfer. The corresponding policy is ( t ; t ) = 1+ ; 0 , as demonstrated in Panel (a) of Figure 3 .
Alternatively, consider the case in which the type-L's income level is too low such that
holds. Because of their very low income level, the type-L agents feel the need for support via lump-sum transfer. However, this support is not enough to …nance private education; they also need support for public education. Therefore, they choose a set of policies including the provision of both public education and lump-sum transfer. The corresponding policy is ( t ; t ) = 
Period-t Political Equilibrium
With the use of the results in Lemmas 1 and 2, we are now able to show the period-t political equilibrium policy for a given L t . Proposition 1. The period-t political equilibrium policy is given as follows:
Proposition 1 states that the economy attains an equilibrium distinguished by the provision of both public education and lump-sum transfer when inequality is high such that L t < (1 )=(1+ ); it attains an equilibrium distinguished by the provision of public education only when inequality is low such that To understand the mechanism behind the result, let us recall the type-L's human capital production function given by
For type-L agents, one unit of investment in public education produces a better return than that in private education because L t < 1 holds. Thus, type-L agents prefer public education to private one from the viewpoint of optimality.
The preferences for the lump-sum transfer b t and the corresponding economic decision on private investment in education z L t are not straightforward; they are dependent on the inequality represented by L t . When the inequality is low such that
type-L agents are endowed with moderately high income, they can a¤ord to invest in private education and thus choose z L t > 0 from the viewpoint of utility maximization. In contrast, when the inequality is moderate such that
1=(1+ ) , type-L agents are endowed with moderately low income and cannot a¤ord the expense of spending in private education; they choose z L t = 0. In both cases, the type-L agents have certain level of income for consumption, and therefore, there is no need to require lump-sum transfer. They prefer public education to lump-sum transfer and thus choose b t = 0 (i.e., t = 0).
Finally, consider the case where the type-L's income level is considerably lower such
. Type-L agents choose z L t = 0 because of their low income level. Given z L t = 0, the type-L's problem for choosing t becomes
The second term corresponds to the utility of consumption, which is dependent on L t ; and the third term corresponds to the utility of public education via the human capital production function, which is independent of L t . As observed in the second term, the marginal utility of lump-sum transfer becomes larger as L t becomes lower. This incentivizes the type-L agents to choose lump-sum transfer. Therefore, the type-L agents choose e t > 0 and b t > 0 in voting for this case.
Notice that the two sorts of equilibria, demonstrated in the present model, come from the external e¤ect of parent's human capital associated with private education. This e¤ect is observed by the term
If the e¤ect is removed from the model, we fail to demonstrate the two types of empirically relevant equilibria. This point is discussed more in detail in Section 5.
4 Steady-state Equilibrium
The characterization of the period-t political equilibrium enables us to clarify the role of inequality in the determination of redistribution policy and to provide empirically relevant results. However, it does not deal with the mutual interaction between inequality and redistribution policy because inequality is considered given. To illustrate the interaction and to explore its implication, we here demonstrate a motion of inequality across periods, and characterize a steady-state equilibrium in which L t = L t+1 holds along the equilibrium path. Based on this characterization, we examine how the structural parameters and , representing family background e¤ects, a¤ect the determination of the steady-state inequality and redistribution policy. We then discuss the implication of the results.
We substitute private educational investment and equilibrium policy into the human capital production function,
, and obtain the period-t + 1 human capital, h i t+1 , as a function of h t and h i t , as follows:
Given the de…nition of the average human capital,
, we can write h t+1 as a function of h t , h L t , and h H t as follows:
Therefore, the period-t + 1 measure of inequality,
After some calculations, we obtain the following law of motion of
where
The function ( ) has the following property: [ Figure 4 here.]
To understand the role of more precisely, consider …rst the case of a low , that is, = 0:6. A low implies that the type-L agents su¤er from low productivity of human capital investment. Given this, the type-L agents expect a low rate of return of private and public education, which gives them a disincentive to pay for private education, and to choose lump-sum transfer rather than public education. Then, the economy realizes a high-inequality equilibrium with government expenditure favoring lump-sum transfer. The opposite result holds when is high such that = 0:75 and 0:9.
In Panel (b), we …x at 0:75 and focus on the parameter for three cases: = 0:05; 0:3 and 0:55: The …gure shows that the economy attains a high-inequality steady state with government expenditure favoring lump-sum transfer when = 0:55, while it attains a low-inequality steady state with government expenditure favoring public education when = 0:3 and 0:05. A lower implies less external e¤ect of parental human capital on the child's human capital formation and thus narrows the gap between the two classes via human capital accumulation. Therefore, the economy is more likely to attain a less unequal state as becomes lower.
In summary, the present numerical investigation suggests that the economy with the weaker family background e¤ect attains a more equal state with government expenditure favoring public education, and the economy with the stronger family background e¤ect attains a less equal state with government expenditure favoring lump-sum transfer. This model prediction should be viewed with caution because it depends on the present model speci…cation. However, it provides a hypothesis about the cross-country di¤erence in inequality and redistribution policies, which should be tested in future research.
Discussion and Extension
The result established so far depends on the assumption of the external e¤ect of parents' human capital on the productivity of private education. The result also depends on the assumption of the type-L majority and on the speci…cation of the logarithmic utility function. In this section, we brie ‡y consider the role of each assumption, and investigate how the result would change if either of them is relaxed or modi…ed.
External E¤ect of Human Capital
The present model assumes that the average human capital h t a¤ects the marginal productivity of public education. The model also assumes that the parents'human capital h i t a¤ects the marginal productivity of private education. When is set to be zero, these e¤ects vanish in the human capital formation; the human capital production function is reduced to
which is similar to that in Gradstein and Justman (1996) .
Given this reduced form of the function, the preferences of a type-L agents are represented by the following indirect utility function:
By comparing Eq. (3) with the above equation, we …nd that when z L = 0, the preferences are not a¤ected by the presence or the absence of the external e¤ects of human capital. The result in Lemma 2 is applicable to the present case. However, the external e¤ects of human capital matter when z L > 0. Lump-sum transfer and public education are perfect substitutes in the absence of the external e¤ects, as we can see in the above expression of V L t;z>0 . In other words, they are indi¤erent for the type-L agents from the viewpoint of utility maximization. Therefore, the allocation of tax revenue, t , becomes indeterminate, which makes sharp prediction di¢ cult. The assumption of the external e¤ects is one of the ways to resolve the problem of indeterminacy.
Type-H Majority
In the main body of the paper, we have conducted the analysis by assuming type-L majority. This assumption re ‡ects the right-skewed income distribution in the real economy.
However, readers may wonder how the result would change when the type-H agents are the majority. Following the same procedure as in the case of the type-L majority, we can characterize the type-H majority political equilibrium and obtain the following result: there is no provision of public education and lump-sum transfer when the type-H agents are the majority (see Appendix A.3 for the proof).
To understand the statement, recall the type-H's human capital production function given by
The return from investment is higher in private education than in public education because H t > 1 holds. Because of this property, the type-H agents have no incentive to allocate the tax revenue to public education. In addition, the type-H agents obtain no bene…t from the lump-sum transfer because it is a redistribution from the type-H agents to the type-L agents. Therefore, the type-H agents prefer no provision of both public education and lump-sum transfer, and choose no taxation as a decisive voter.
A Constant Elasticity-of-Substitution Utility Function
At this point, we have conducted the analysis by assuming a logarithmic utility function.
This speci…cation makes the analysis tractable, but results in a private investment function that is independent of the productivity of human capital, A i , the average human capital, h t , and other parameters. This subsection introduces a constant elasticity-of-substitution utility function to resolve this problem. This subsection demonstrates that the result is qualitatively unchanged even if we generalize the utility function.
Consider the following utility function:
where > 1 and 6 = 1 hold. 4 When agents' preferences are speci…ed by this utility 4 The function becomes the logarithmic utility function
function, the period-t political equilibrium policy is given by
respectively. The proof of the statement here is provided in Appendix A.4.
The result described thus far indicates that the critical value of L t depends on the average human capital, h t , and the type-L's human capital productivity, A L . This property is not observed in the logarithmic utility function case as demonstrated in Proposition 1. However, the equilibrium redistributive policy established here is qualitatively equivalent to that in Proposition 1. There is a provision of both public education and lump-sum transfer when inequality is high, while there is no provision of lump-sum transfer when inequality is low. The reason for this equivalence lies in the fact that there is no intertemporal decision making on savings in the present model. In other words, there is no substitution e¤ect through the interest rate, which may dominate the income e¤ect, depending on the elasticity of substitution. Given this lack of the substitution e¤ect, we have found that the generalization of the utility function does not qualitatively a¤ect the choice of redistribution policy through voting.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have developed a theoretical framework that studies the voting on public education and lump-sum transfer in an overlapping generations model with two types of family dynasties classi…ed according to their endowed level of human capital. In doing this, we have argued that the marginal productivity of private education increases with the parent's human capital level, and this family background e¤ect in ‡uences agents' preferences for the two redistribution policies.
Our model predicts that a higher (lower) inequality is associated with the government expenditure favoring lump-sum transfer (public education). In other words, there is a positive correlation between inequality and the ratio of lump-sum transfer to public education. This model prediction is in line with the empirical evidence observed in OECD countries.
To illustrate the source of this correlation, we focus on the family background e¤ect. We show that the economy with stronger (weaker) family background e¤ect attains a less (more) equal state with the government expenditure favoring lump-sum transfer (public education).
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 2.
As demonstrated in Figure 2 , two cases should be considered: (a) the case of 1+
In case (a), there are two possible solutions: one characterized by no redistribution with t = 0, and the other characterized by some redistribution with t > 0. They are given by ( t ; t ) = 1 + ; 0 and ^ t ;^ t where^ t > 0:
By direct calculation, we …nd that the former solution, ( =(1 + ); 0), satis…es the z
The latter solution, ^ t ;^ t , does not satisfy the z L t = 0 condition. To prove this argument, suppose that ^ t ;^ t is available in equilibrium in the case of That is, the following condition holds for some t 2 1
The condition is rewritten as follows:
This contradicts the presumption of In case (b), the solution is interior as illustrated in Panel (b) of Figure 2 . By direct calculation, we obtain
We substitute this solution into the condition z L t = 0 in (6) and …nd that z L t = 0 holds if L t
1.
Finally, we show that z
Suppose that (1 )=(1+ ) L t holds. We substitute the solution ( t ; t ) = ( =(1 + ); 0) into the above condition and obtain
which holds for any H t because the left-hand side is less than one and the right-hand side is greater than one by the de…nition of
Alternatively, suppose that L t < (1 )=(1 + ) holds. We substitute the solution 
A.2 Derivation of (7)
To derive Eq. (7), recall that the average human capital in period
With the de…nition of
The next task is to compute h 
A. 
A.4 A Constant Elasticity-of-Substitution Utility Function
where > 1 and 6 = 1 hold. We compute the type-L's indirect utility function as follows:
is de…ned as follows: The …rst-order condition with respect to t is (1 )
Taking account of a corner solution, we obtain the following reaction function of t : 
Suppose that t > 0 holds in (11) . With the use of (9) and (10), we obtain
Therefore, t > 0 holds if and only if 1 . We set θ = 0.5 and ϕ L = 0.6. In Panel (a), we fix µ at 0.25, and illustrate three cases, α = 0.6, 0.75, and 0.9. In Panel (b), we fix α at 0.75 and illustrate three cases, µ = 0.05, 0.3, and 0.55.
